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The Constitution of Organization as Informational Individuation 
 
Abstract 
Communication scholars, especially in organizational communication, call for a constitutive 
approach to communication that considers communicating and organizing as a single process. 
Yet, current theorizing seems unable to embrace that equivalence. As an alternative, we present 
an informationally grounded view of communication drawing from French philosopher Gilbert 
Simondon. Doing so, we extend scholarship on the communicative constitution of organization 
by highlighting the importance of framing communication in the context of informational 
individuation. Following a critical summary of constitutive communication theories, we provide 
a brief exegesis of Simondon’s concepts of individuation and transduction, which bind 
information and communication, and contribute four propositions to guide informationally-
grounded work on the constitutive power of communication. We then emphasize how a 
Simondonian view contributes to discussions on the communicating–organizing equation. We 
end by providing a brief empirical example and analysis using key take-aways from a 
Simondonian framework and offer areas for further discussion.  
 
Keywords: Gilbert Simondon; organizational communication; organizational discourse; 
communication theory; individuation; transduction; philosophy of communication  
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The Constitution of Organization as Informational Individuation 
 
Introduction 
The idea that communication, discourse, and/or interaction, are constitutive of identities, 
bodies, genders, social ties, capital, and other phenomena is growingly popular (Ashcraft & 
Mumby, 2004; Butler, 1993; Kuhn, Ashcraft, & Cooren, 2017). This idea has found particular 
traction in organizational communication research, where communication has been described as 
constitutive of collective and organizational realties (Boje, Oswick, & Ford, 2004; Cooren, 2007; 
Grant, Michelson, Oswick, & Wailes, 2005; Putnam & Nicotera, 2009). Such perspectives have 
appeared as a counter-balance to emphases on structural and institutional dimensions of 
organizations (see e.g., Zundel, Holt, & Cornelissen, 2013). More generally, the idea that 
communication is constitutive of social reality has been proposed as a “metamodel” for 
communication theory (Craig, 1999, 2015). 
While communication scholars adopt constitutive approaches to communication to 
conceptualize the agency in/of  collectives – in particular in the case of organizations (Cooren, 
2000; McPhee & Zaug, 2000; Putnam & Nicotera, 2009; Taylor & Van Every, 2000) – these 
efforts are still at a loss when attempting to account for the apparently plural, contradictory, or 
paradoxical nature of these collectives, thus pointing to the need for a new (meta)theoretical 
model (Putnam, Fairhurst, & Banghart, 2016). We suggest that understanding communication’s 
role in the constitution of collectives in all its diversity would benefit from a renewed philosophy 
of communication. Such a philosophy would situate informational individuation – a notion we 
define below – as a prima facie foundation for understanding organization at various levels of 
abstraction and granularity, in the way that an animal may be defined or observed by its DNA at 
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the same time as by its behavior in a group—both examples representing different abstractions of 
a singular reality made up of the same existing information at various levels.  
Current perspectives suggest that communication and organization (or communicating 
and organizing) are not distinct phenomena (see e.g., Smith, 1993; Taylor & Van Every, 2000), 
yet, for the most part, they continue to rely on well-traveled theories of communication to 
understand organizational constitution. Therefore, while scholars seek to explain the constitution 
of entities, they in fact rely on theories that consider communication as taking place between or 
within pre-existing entities. This is salient, for instance, in the diversity of perspectives that 
attempt to reconcile communication with materiality, thus suggesting that material and human 
entities pre-exist the communicative practices that connect them (Putnam, 2015). As a result, they 
produce partial accounts bound to appear contradictory, as they have yet to be unified within a 
cohesive theory of communication. Indeed, few theoretical proposals account at once for 
communicating and for organizing, as we remain trapped with the idea that we first need people 
to speak, channels to convey information through space, and ideas to be exchanged. How can 
communication and information theory explain how speaking, informing, and exchanging 
generate people, channels, space, and ideas?  
One exception is James R. Taylor’s (1995, 2001) invitation to think of communication as 
an “autonomous” process and of conversations as autopoietic units. Communication and 
conversation, in this sense, are not the products of already-constituted individuals or entities, or 
the transmission of messages from one person to another. Instead, communication and 
conversation ensure their own reproduction and distinction from others. As they reproduce 
themselves, they are constitutive of – rather than constituted by – individual and organizational 
entities. To formulate his proposal, Taylor draws on Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s 
(1980, 1987) systems theory, but also on conversation analysis (Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 1989), 
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speech acts theory (Austin, 1962), as well as the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (1986), Niklas 
Luhmann (1992) and Karl Weick (1979) – not to mention other systems theorists such as Bateson 
(1972) or Watzlawick (e.g., Watzlawick, Bavelas, & Jackson, 2011). These additional 
contributions allow Taylor to account for, respectively, the reflexive and performative nature of 
communication, the existence of variously-organized domains of language, the way 
communication constitutes boundaries to both distinguish and interface with the environment, 
and the enacted nature of that environment.  
Yet, while Taylor’s work has generally been acclaimed, this particular proposal has 
received little attention (an exception being Cheong, Hwang, & Brummans, 2014). We therefore 
reiterate and build on Taylor’s work, to spell out its implications for issues of constitution and 
individuation, signification and methodology. We do so by tracing back the source of these ideas 
to a different origin. Indeed, decades prior to Maturana and Varela (1980, 1987), and Luhmann 
(1981, 1992), the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon (1958/2005) had already proposed that 
communication theory must think about information and communication in the same terms as 
organizing and structuring. Aligning ourselves with and drawing inspiration from work on the 
sociomateriality of information (Cecez-Kecmanovic, Galliers, Henfridsson, Newell, & Vidgen, 
2014; Dourish, 2017; Dourish & Mazmanian, 2013; Leonardi, 2012, 2013; Leonardi & Barley, 
2010), we suggest that Simodon’s informationally grounded philosophy of communication 
(Bardini, 2014; Barthélémy, 2005, 2014; Styhre, 2010) may be well-suited for thinking about the 
constitution of social order and collectives, including organizations, to understand more broadly 
what Barad (2007, p. 24) refers to as the nature of “meaning making, and the relationship 
between discursive practices and the material world.” Specifically, Simondon offers answers to 
many questions that Taylor raises, such as the relationship between action and communication, 
boundaries between systems, and homogeneity within one system. While Simondon’s ideas have 
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become popular in the technology literature (Dakers, 2016; De Boever, Murray, & Roffe, 2009), 
his relevance to the study of collectives and organizing is just being discovered (Bencherki, 2017; 
Styhre, 2010, 2017), as evidenced by a recent Culture and Organization special issue (see 
Letiche & Moriceau, 2017). 
We refer to Simondon’s theory as informational because the notion of information is key 
in his work. From Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver (1998) to Gregory Bateson (1972), 
information has traditionally been defined as a difference between two states; a homogeneous, 
uniform system contains no information. Information, mathematically, is what is (im)probable 
within a given system; in a broader sense, it is a symbol, state, etc. that differs from an 
alternative. Uniquely, for Simondon (1958/2005), information consists of potentially active 
energy differentials; information exists where “domains” – understood as similarly-ordered 
regions of social, physical, technical, or cognitive activity, in the way that an open clearing is a 
domain distinct from the forest – within a system, or two or more systems, carry different levels 
of potentially active energy. Keeping in mind that energy’s Greek etymology finds its roots in 
ergon (action), then it is the difference in action potential between domains that defines 
information, not unlike the way a “sick” body is defined by its different (potential) behavior in 
comparison to the surrounding bodies whose behavior define “normalcy” and “health” 
(Canguilhem, 1989). This difference between two action potentials – what Simondon refers as 
“disparation” – will tend to seek resolution, which takes place trough communication, namely the 
movement of action from one domain to another (or different regions within a domain, which 
then form domains within the broader domain, like subsystems within a system, ad infinitum). 
The energy from one domain to the other transmits from kin to kin, a phenomenon Simondon 
refers to as “transduction.” By “kin to kin” (de proche en proche in French), Simondon means 
that any action propagates in a proximal way, from one being to the next, one encounter at a time. 
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There is no abstract transmission of information, but a finger pressing on a keyboard, transmitting 
an electrical signal to a microprocessor, and then on to a Wi-Fi antenna, to a router, to an optical 
fiber, to another and another, all the way to the screen of a reader, each time reordering a domain. 
To make a difference, then, communication must be taken up by the receiving domain, which can 
only welcome this new contribution if it (the receiving domain) is already structured in such a 
way to allow for the new action to make any difference. The difference that is made is the 
signification (i.e. meaning) of communication. For instance, the internal ordering of a classroom 
is such that students talking to each other – forming a domain of their own with a different energy 
potential – would “mean” a disturbance; during recess, the same group of students, possibly in 
the same room, would be ordered differently, and the same two students’ conversation would 
mean something different, such as friendly play. 
Information is therefore what triggers metastable systems (i.e. where energy is not 
homogeneously distributed) to resolve their internal incompatibility into an organised reality; in 
doing so, they also produce further transductions (Iliadis, 2017). Information is an action—it is 
the difference that affects a metastable system and leads it to a new ordering through 
communication (the active taking up of this ordering). For instance, the coupling between two 
students’ conversation and a classroom is a metastable system made up of two differently ordered 
domains, while a conversation and recess in the playground constitute a more stable, similarly 
ordered system. Communication is the process of information’s circulation through the very 
systems whose reordering it provokes (Simondon, 2010). In other words, communication systems 
do not pre-exist the communication of information, since a system – whether physical, technical, 
or social – is made up of information, at different levels of abstraction and granularity, separated 
by invisible partitions. In this sense, Simondon’s take on information and communication offers a 
theory that thinks of communication from the vantage point of its organizing power. That is why, 
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for Simondon, information and communication lead to individuation—the constitution of new 
entities or collectives. 
To clarify how communicating and organizing can be thought together through a 
Simondinian perspective, the next section reviews existing literature on the connection between 
the two notions and identifies key attempts to establish an equivalence between them. Following 
that, the section titled “Informational Individuation” presents our approach to Simondon’s theory 
and introduces the relevant vocabulary. The heart of the argument is presented in the section after 
that and includes four proposals that briefly summarize the implications of Simondon’s thinking 
for organizational communication research. An empirical example then shows how these four 
proposals can guide an analysis of organizational communication data. The paper’s contributions, 
limitations, and suggestions for future research are given in the conclusion. 
Current Understandings of the Constitutive Power of Communication 
The idea that communication is constitutive of social order and collectives is per se not 
new. Arguably, it can be traced to social constructivism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and even 
prior to that to symbolic interactionism and to the idea that people jointly constitute meaning (e.g. 
Mead, 1934). The “constitutive model” considers that communication has the power to constitute 
realities, including communication as a discipline (Craig, 1999), through the mediation of the 
meaning human interactants make as they exchange signs (Carey, 1989; Krippendorff, 1997). 
This perspective, as Taylor (2001) notes, arguably restricts communication’s constitutive power 
to its ability to generate meaning within the minds of already-constituted human beings that are 
distinct from the material and/or social world they attempt to understand. This raises questions 
about the mode of existence of the “social realities” it helps bring about, as they may be 
suspected to only exist within human imagination. 
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These limitations are attributable, we argue, to the theories of communication that 
underlie even the most earnest efforts to describe communication as constitutive. The subfield of 
organizational communication probably is host to the most heated conversations surrounding 
communication’s ability to constitute collective entities, namely organizations (Putnam & 
Fairhurst, 2015). In particular, a tradition within organizational communication has been 
gradually emerging, under the name of Communicative Constitution of Organization (or CCO), 
that puts the constitutive model at its center (for a review, see Boivin, Brummans, & Barker, 
2017). Recently, CCO researchers have become concerned about their own assumptions, as 
demonstrated by a series of roundtable meetings confronting perspectives within the tradition, 
including a 2012 debate between François Cooren, David Seidl, and Robert D. McPhee at the 
University of Hamburg, Germany; a panel bringing together Dan Kärreman, Linda Putnam, and 
Cliff Oswick during the European Group for Organizational Studies conference in 2015; or 
Putnam’s intervention at the 2015 Philosophy of Communication conference at Duquesne 
University, where she presented a comprehensive overview of the contradictions and paradoxes 
organizations face, and how organizational communication has attempted to deal with them 
(Putnam et al., 2016). 
 The 2012 Hamburg roundtable is reproduced in Schoeneborn, Blaschke, Cooren, 
McPhee, Seidl and Taylor (2014) in a point-counterpoint format that allows a glimpse into the 
underlying theories of each of the three CCO perspectives represented: the Montreal School, 
voiced by François Cooren; the Luhmannian school, voiced by David Seidl, and Robert 
McPhee’s Four Flows perspectives. The debate reveals that each perspective rests on a view of 
communication that is not, as such, specifically linked to the idea that communicating and 
organizing are a single process. Dennis Schoeneborn, acting as a facilitator, asked the panelists a 
question concerning how each of them defined communication. Seidl, describing Luhmann’s 
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theory, explained that the German philosopher conceived of communication as the synthesis 
between information, utterance, and understanding. McPhee suggested that communication 
involves the interplay – or, to use his term, “transtruction” – of signification, domination, 
legitimation, and constitution, each being mediated by the others, while preserving the 
“interpretive emphasis on tacit skills and interaction as achievement” (Schoeneborn et al., 2014, 
p. 291). Cooren admitted that there is no consensus on what communication means even within 
the Montreal School, before suggesting that “communication is, first and foremost, considered as 
action,” and that action is not limited to a single human agent (Schoeneborn et al., 2014, p. 286). 
In saying this, Cooren acknowledges the Montreal School’s reliance on speech acts theory 
(Austin, 1962; Searle, 1979) and a pragmatic understanding of communication (mostly drawn 
from Peirce, 1958; Taylor, 2001, also evokes American pragmatism). 
The three different answers provided by Cooren, Seidl, and McPhee illustrate that a 
unified theory of communication is largely absent from research on the constitutive power of 
communication. There is indeed a general lack of reflexivity on this question in communication 
scholarship, including in organizational communication. Focusing on talk, conversation, 
interaction, or similar phenomena is certainly a valid criterion to situate the conversation within 
the field of communication, but it may not be quite enough to provide us with a coherent theory 
of what makes communication “organizational” or constitutive of collectives, including society. 
For instance, Seidl’s answer may imply a systems-based or cybernetic understanding of 
communication that is coherent with Luhmann’s systems theory, but which perhaps brings the 
question “How does communication constitute organizations?” back to an emitter (utterance), 
message (information), receiver (understanding) model that may not be specific to or informed by 
an interest in organizations in the making. For instance, despite the title of his article – "What is 
communication?” – Luhmann (1992) never actually defines communication, but convincingly 
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demonstrates its role in the self-reproduction of systems. This is perhaps why Seidl and other 
Luhmann-inspired researchers do a good job at describing how organizations may be viewed as 
based on communication, but they – similar to the field of communication more generally – do 
not address the way the opposite could be possible. As for structuration theory, on which the Four 
Flows model is erected, its relation to communication remains ambiguous in Giddens’ (1984) 
work, as Richter (2000) notes. Even though communication, along with power and rules, is one 
of the dimensions along which agency and structure are articulated, Richter explains that 
communication as such is addressed only in passing. Indeed, “Giddens was notoriously brief in 
his discussion of communication” (McPhee & Iverson, 2009, p. 52). The Montreal School, for its 
part, does show how communication has organizing properties (Cooren, 2000), i.e., how 
communication impacts organizing processes from a perspective combining speech acts and 
interaction analysis, but remains somewhat unclear on whether this process rests on human 
understanding (see Wilhoit, 2016). 
CCO researchers, like other communication scholars, continue, despite claims to the 
contrary, to think of communication as a phenomenon distinct from the entities whose 
constitution they try to elucidate. It consists of – to quote Cooren’s answer – “what people say, 
write, or do,” which then, in a second stage, may or may not influence the constitution of the 
organization. Any truly constitutive theory of communication we end up adopting should not 
consider communication as a supplement or a double to an allegedly prior reality (see Rosset, 
2012)—for example as a layer of description on top of a stable substrate of material and social 
reality (see the critique of Bourdieu in Butler, 1999).  
Some social theories have been imported into (organizational) communication studies 
exactly because they do not need to postulate a prior social order. For instance, 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 1989) 
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take as their starting point situated interactions, and show how, from there, people (re)constitute 
the rules that bind them in turn. Ethnomethodology is employed in some branches of CCO, in 
particular within the Montreal School (Brummans, 2006; Cooren & Fairhurst, 2008), which 
supplements it with actor-network theory to provide an account of the endurance of collectives 
(with which ethnomethodology is not concerned as such). Ethnomethodology conceives itself 
largely as being a-theoretical and, despite its relative popularity in communication departments, it 
has not troubled itself with any definition of communication. That said, it is perhaps 
ethnomethodology – and its focus on the actions people perform as part of their enactment of 
social order – that Cooren had in mind when, in his answer to Schoeneborn, he equates 
communication with action. This equation and emphasis on action are also important to 
Simondon. 
Another set of theories that were brought into the discipline to account for 
communication’s constitutive power is American pragmatism (see Misak, 2013) and in particular 
the pragmatic semiotics of Peirce (1958), which has been explored more recently by Taylor and 
Van Every (2014). Peirce's semiotics locates signification in a three-way relationship between a 
first item (the thing alluded to), a second (the symbol, icon, or trace that stands for it) and a third 
– the interpretant – which is the rule, routine, or process by which the relation is performed. For 
Taylor and Van Every (2014), this triad is inherently organizational, inasmuch as signification is 
both made possible by and productive of a structure where the interpretant operates the semiosis. 
In other words, signification is equated, in Peirce's theory, with the creation and maintenance of a 
configuration of relations between the components of the triad. 
Without dismissing the importance these ideas have had in communication studies, we 
introduce an alternative theoretical tradition in the writings of Simondon and suggest a 
philosophy of communication based on his conceptualization of informational individuation. 
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Simondon’s informational ontology (Iliadis, 2013) considers communicating and organizing as a 
single practice governed by constitutive informational structures. It offers an integration of many 
conceptual elements that are currently scattered across theories, including that communication 
creates (social) order, provides endurance to that order through materiality, and that signification 
proceeds from the relations it constitutes. 
Informational Individuation 
We suggest that Simondon’s (1958/2005) notions of individuation and transduction may 
contribute to communication theory by extending debates on the constitutive power of 
communication with a nuanced articulation of the materiality of information. Simondon explains 
that the notion of “form” should be replaced by the notion of “information,” arguing that 
information provides a clearer pathway for understanding how entities and relations are 
organized and individuated at multiple scales through transduction.  
Simondon conceptualized individuation as the processual emergence of physical, 
technical, psychological, or collective entities, and argued that we should prioritise processes of 
informational individuation over individual objects and subjects themselves. He often stated that 
it is information – as an action differential that may take many guises; what we understand as 
data, semantic information, environmental information, etc. – that is the engine of individuation, 
rather than supposedly external factors that would precipitate a rudimentary form of physical 
causality. Simondon suggested that even when seemingly external forces produce entities (one of 
his more popular examples refers to molds that shape clay into bricks), what is at play is the 
proximal propagation of information, i.e. transduction, across levels of abstraction. The process 
of transduction organizes entities as it propagates from one level to another. In the words of 
Simondon (1958/2005, p. 32, we translate): 
INFORMATIONAL INDIVIDUATION 14 
What is meant by transduction is the physical, biological, mental, social operation by 
which an activity propagates from kin to kin within a domain, grounding this propagation 
on the structuration of the domain, from place to place: each constituted region of 
structure serves as a principle of constitution to the next region, in such a way that a 
change extends progressively at the same time as the structuring operation. 
Transduction is therefore the process by which action circulates through propagation, 
reorganizing elements along the way. If we equate transduction to communication (as was 
Simondon’s intention), then it becomes apparent how the communication of information is not 
distinct from organization. For Simondon, then, communication is action that propagates by 
informationally organizing; action is both the process of communication and its content.  
The fact that transduction implies organization is clear in the field of biology, where 
Simondon first encountered the notion. In biology, transduction refers to the translation of one 
signal into another, for example the translation of a chemical signal into an electrical signal at the 
level of synapses. Transduction is therefore not the invariable displacement of one thing from one 
place to another but rather the precarious and continuous translation of action into equivalent 
action. Latour’s (1999) notion of “immutable mobiles” covers a similar idea; that equivalence 
may be preserved but only at the price of the important toil of transformation. This means that 
transduction occurs as it transforms its domain, and structures it in ways that allow its 
propagation. Citton (2004) suggests that, in Simondonian thinking, disparation is productive and 
allows the constitution of collectives; it is the differences or inconsistencies between orderings 
that lead to the creation of new ways of communicating between them and therefore to new 
orderings. 
Simondon’s informational perspective also attends to a common concern in the literature 
on the communicative constitution of organizations, namely how situated action may “scale up” 
to constitute seemingly larger entities (Cooren & Fairhurst, 2008; Hardy, 2004; Robichaud, 
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2003). That process is not a matter of sequential physical steps (individual people first and then a 
collective) nor is it a synthesis (Simondon, 1958/2005). Levels of informational abstraction exist, 
in the same way that the DNA of a single cell exists and is as real as the human individual to 
whom it belongs—Simondon would say that to causally prioritise one over the other is a fallacy. 
Simondon contrasts transduction with induction; the latter creates abstract categories by reducing 
the terms to some of their commonalities (for instance, the category of “tall men” reduces 
individuals to their size and gender), thus sacrificing their singularity. This is what happens when 
an organization or a nation is reduced to some general features of the people who work or live 
within them. Transduction, in contrast, is the discovery of the ways in which the total reality of 
each entity may be informationally “communicated” (Simondon uses the word, p. 34) and 
ordered “without loss, without reduction, into the newly discovered structures.” He further 
explains the materiality of information in transduction, writing that 
Transduction is characterized by the fact that the result of this operation is a concrete 
fabric including all the initial elements; the resulting system is made up of concreteness 
and includes all concreteness (p. 34). 
For Simondon, the outcome of the constitutive process is not an abstraction of the similarities 
between pre-existing individuals. Rather, transduction is the practical effort of finding out 
tangible ways in which concrete information can pass on actions along an informational chain. In 
doing so, information reconfigures or constitutes collectives, societies, and organizations that are 
not more abstract than, say, human beings; rather, they are of a different informational level, as 
they correspond to the ordering (including the ordering of human beings) that took place as action 
found a way to circulate. Simondon’s informational view is therefore resolutely relational, in the 
sense that the structure of information precedes any notion of an already constituted being that 
would initiate communication. In that sense, Simondon converges with current efforts to bring to 
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the forefront the relational underpinnings of CCO scholarship (Cooren, 2015; Kuhn et al., 2017; 
Martine & Cooren, 2016) and to avoid thinking of communication as occurring between pre-
existing entities. Simondon contrasts the notion of information with that of form, which supposes 
that “the relation is posterior to the existence of the terms” and that can only “capture an 
impoverished reality, without potential, and consequently unable to individuate” (p. 35). 
Simondon’s ideas have important implications, we argue, for how we think about 
meaning, as there are no individuals already available to “interpret” information. Instead, 
meaning or, as Simondon refers to it, signification, emerges when the disparation between two 
domains is resolved. In other words, what an action means corresponds to the ordering that action 
brings about in a given domain. To return back to the example of students chatting in the 
classroom, their voices interrupt the teacher’s lesson and, thus, question the current ordering; 
during recess, it means business as usual or even a reinforcement and validation of the current 
activity, i.e., playtime. For Simondon (1958/2005, p. 35), “the significant [meaningful] form […] 
is the structure of compatibility and of viability”—signification is obtained in the process of 
communication that attempts to resolve the disparation between orderings, to make them 
compatible and to ensure their continued existence. Indeed, for a teacher in a classroom, the 
adjustments they would make to make their pedagogy “compatible” and “viable” with respect to 
the ordering that prevails between the talkative students would mean something quite different 
than the adjustments needed to accommodate them during recess. Such an understanding can be 
equated with a pragmatic view of meaning that is inherently organizational; meaningful 
communication is communication that succeeds at resolving inconsistencies between ways of 
organizing. Information, then, is the process of bringing about a new ordering to practically 
resolve the disparity. 
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Furthermore, for Simondon, informational individuation does not exist in a single, 
homogenous reality—for instance, it is not only the individuation of people, or that of 
organizations, that interests him. Rather, individuation exists according to ordered levels of 
abstraction that disclose new informational levels where entities emerge at greater or lesser 
degrees of granularity. Said otherwise, the individuation of a cell, of a person, and of an 
organization continue into each other and coexist at once (think, for instance, of an individual’s 
mental health issues at work that make a difference at the biological, psychological, and 
organizational levels all at once). In this sense, information has the capacity to propagate action 
across levels; the action of chemical deficits within a synapse can make a simultaneous difference 
in the way a person organizes their behaviour and in the way an organization organizes its work, 
for instance, at the human resources department. Insurance forms will need to be produced to 
consider medication formulated according to the way brain cells work. In other words, a same 
action can have cascading meanings as it reorganizes systems at several levels of abstraction, 
without ever losing specificity.  
A Simondonian view of communication and signification may rework the presumption, in 
communication studies, that talking, or writing should be primary concerns. For instance, while 
Taylor (1995, 2001) suggests that an autopoietic systems perspective allows recognizing that 
conversations self-reproduce and lead to further conversations, thinking in terms of transduction 
recognizes that conversations are first and foremost ordered systems of actions, that must further 
reorder under the impulse of new action; in this sense, it brings Taylor’s proposal closer to the 
way ethnomethodology or conversation analysis thinks of conversations, i.e. in terms of actions 
that are produced to deal with an interlocutor’s prior actions. Yet, Simondon also allows doing so 
without the need to presume that communication is the product of individuals or that its 
interpretation lies in the mind of people, thus also connecting with Luhmann’s (1992) invitation 
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to de-center communication from human beings, but also allowing to account for the way 
humans may interact with non-human participants within a system (see Cooren, 2015). 
Simondon’s most important contribution, we think, is to be able to speak at once of 
communication and existence, or information and individuation. In this sense, he collapses the 
usual distinctions between subject/object, micro/macro, realism/antirealism, and 
abstract/concrete. These dualities are at the heart of communication studies’ struggle with 
paradoxes and contradictions (see Putnam et al., 2016) and may be resolved once reality is 
thought of in terms of informational individuation operating at several levels simultaneously.  
In this sense, Simondon viewed information as multimodal and as something that could 
be exchanged not only between beings who are already individuated (e.g. people engaging in 
conversation) but also within systems to come that are productive of new individuations. On this 
theory, information is internally complex and should not be confused as consisting only of things 
like (media) signals. 
Implications for Research Methodology and Organizations 
What sort of organizational communication research would communication scholars be 
doing if they adopted a theory of communication inspired by Simondon? The philosopher himself 
provides some very useful starting points in answering this question. First of all, as Combes 
(1999, p. 18) notes, a Simondonian approach implies a focus on the individuation of the entities 
under study: “we can only account for the possibility of knowing individuated beings by 
providing a description of their individuation.” This entails, for instance, that there is not, on the 
one hand, a description of an organization and, on the other hand, a description of the constitution 
of the organization. Any description of organizations, membership, identity, power, or any of the 
things that organizational communication scholars study should be a description of the way those 
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entities have come to exist. This does not mean that descriptions are also performative (although 
they may be), but – on the contrary – that descriptions must recapitulate the performances that 
allowed the being to come into existence in the first place.  
While we may be comfortable with this first epistemological suggestion, Simondon 
pushes the envelope further when he discusses the relationship between the researcher and the 
object being observed. If we cannot describe an entity but by describing its individuation, it 
results that we cannot describe ourselves – researchers – or the knowledge we produce, without 
also making those descriptions in terms of individuation processes: “the operation of 
individuation cannot tolerate an already-constituted observer” (Combes, 1999, p. 16). Simondon 
sheds some light on how this seemingly tall order could be fulfilled: “This process consists in 
following the being through its genesis, and to accomplish the genesis of thought at the same 
time as the object’s genesis unfolds” (Simondon, 1958/2005, p. 34). He further notes that “it is by 
the individuation of knowledge rather than by knowledge alone that the individuation of beings is 
comprehended” (p. 36). The apprehension of the researcher’s capacity to know and how this 
capacity is formulated is as important as the object of study, clearly showing parallels with calls 
for reflexivity in qualitative research (Arvay, 2003; Cunliffe, 2003; Macbeth, 2001). 
Concretely, this means that knowledge of the constitution of organizations does not 
proceed from external relationship to communication processes. Rather, researchers are 
implicated in those processes, which shape them in turn. This is consistent with a transductive 
communication theory that necessarily implies transduction and, therefore, transformation. 
Information – say, about organizational processes – is not simply transmitted to the researcher; 
rather, it shapes a domain, propagates from the host organization to the university, and produces a 
new way of ordering research, students, writings, and thoughts. What a “finding” means is what 
it does to the researcher to the extent as they are embedded in a domain (or several domains, 
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which each provide it with meaning): their field, their community, their department, and so forth. 
It is only in this new ordering that a new piece of knowledge can be significant or meaningful 
(compare this with Latour, 1987). 
In connection with the issue of distinguishing the researcher from their object of study, 
Simondon’s proposal more generally invites caution in distinguishing all beings (or categories of 
being) from each other. The key element of a Simondonian methodology, as Iliadis (2013) 
suggests, is that it is an invitation to look at the way beings’ individuation proceeds through the 
communication of action. Whether in describing others or in describing the self, what matters is 
how beings of different levels of abstraction – from molecules to society – are constituted 
through information, as they organize to accommodate new actions that affect them and as their 
organization, in turn, creates new information that affects others. What distinguishes beings from 
each other, including the researcher from his or her field, is difference in ordering, rather than 
external or a priori categories. 
Going back to our earlier discussion about the origins of CCO research, in Seidl’s answer 
to a question about his view of organizations, he was careful to restrict his understanding of 
organization to the “narrower, institutional sense” (Schoeneborn et al., 2014). This answer 
recognizes the problem that Sillince (2009) identified with research on the communicative 
constitution of organizations, namely that communication researchers tend to use the term 
“organization” to speak of all sorts of things – businesses, markets, groups, and so forth – without 
specifying what distinguishes each of those collectives from the other.  
What matters, for Simondon, is not so much an external definition or bracketing of a 
domain, as much as an internal ordering whose logic distinguishes different domains for practical 
purposes. This should be contrasted, for example, with the notion of boundary that is common in 
organizational literature, perhaps most importantly in a Luhmannian perspective that states that 
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“to maintain its existence, the organization continuously needs to reproduce a boundary that 
distinguishes it from its environment” (Schoeneborn, 2011, p. 678). Relying on an internal logic 
rather than an external definition or delineation means that what counts or not as a separate 
organization may be anything from a group of colleagues at work, a sub-unit, a portion of a 
market, and so on, as long as they are ordered differently from their neighbors. In fact, 
Simondon’s work consists precisely in showing how transduction can propagate from the 
physical, to the biological, to the psychological, and to the collective, with a detour through the 
technical; even the very ontology of entities is an after-the-fact outcome, rather than the starting 
point of investigation.  
To summarize Simondon’s ideas of individuation, transduction, and information, and 
their import for (organizational) communication, we may formulate four propositions: 
1. Information is a differential in action potential that emerges from disparity in ordering 
between domains. Communication is the kin to kin propagation of action that seeks to 
resolve disparity and, in doing so, organizes a domain as it circulates through it.  
2. Entities, including organizations and other collectives, are not at different stages of 
individuation, but rather different informational levels that preserve all the 
characteristics of their organized components. An employee is not prior to the 
organization, nor is the organization an abstraction of its employees; they each exist 
fully and simultaneously. 
3. The meaning or signification of any action – including acts of language – corresponds 
to its participation in the resolution of a disparity of ordering. In other words, what 
information means – its signification – corresponds to the way it reorders a domain. 
The announcement of a new contract, for instance, does not mean the same thing if it 
mobilizes troops than if it leads to people going on sick leave. 
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4. Knowledge of an entity or of any of its facets should focus on its individuation 
process and should reflect on the way that knowledge itself has individuated. Said 
otherwise, knowing, say, an organization, is knowing how I have changed along with 
it as I have come to know it. 
In concrete terms, these proposals mean that the researcher would need to free themselves 
from the shackles of a dualistic epistemology opposing the knowing subject and the known 
object. Deductive knowledge, establishing categories of beings and possible causalities in 
advance, would also have to be abandoned. The goal of research would consist in following 
action itself as it moves along information paths, from one being to the next. Those paths are not 
given in advance either; they consist precisely in the way a domain is organized to become 
capable of accommodating that information. To understand what action means, the researcher 
would need to note how the observed domain has had to reorganize itself considering that new 
information. They would have to show, for instance, how a teacher had to stop their lesson to 
shush two talkative students; this new ordering of the classroom means that the talk was a 
disruption. 
Any research method that a communication researcher chooses, in this sense, would have 
to fulfill a specific agenda. First, it would have to allow observing action as it unfolds and follow 
its movements. It would need to have the empirical precision and granularity not to mix up, for 
instance, action with people’s interpretation of it in interviews. The latter, if they are used as data, 
would have to be treated as action in their own right. Second, it would have to avoid recreating 
the subject-object dichotomy, for instance, in presuming a knowing researcher and a knowable 
organization. In this sense, it would have to treat knowledge creation as a process taking place on 
the same ontological and epistemological plane as the observed processes and consider the 
researcher on the same terms as the researched. Third, it would have to remain agnostic as to the 
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nature of the beings and entities that participate in information and individuation, as well as to the 
nature of those that may come out of information and individuation processes. It would have to 
be able to speak in the same terms of humans, technologies, documents, ideas or rules, and 
recognize that determining which is which is the outcome of inquiry, not its starting point. 
Finally, and in relation with the prior point, it would have to refrain from presuming the prior 
existence of some beings, for instance, human beings making sense of their organization—
otherwise, it would take for granted the very result it seeks to reach. These four points could in 
fact be seen as different formulations of a same principle: to avoid giving ontological priority to 
one being or set of beings at the expense of others, by presuming that they already exist and are 
available to shape, interpret, or otherwise bring into existence. 
While a Simondonian perspective on communication corresponds more to a change in 
attitude than to prescription, it is still possible to identify, provisionally, at least a few data-
gathering and data analysis avenues that fulfill the above agenda. For instance, ethnography 
(Heath & Hindmarsh, 2002; Meunier & Vásquez, 2008; Ybema, Yanow, Wels, & Kamsteeg, 
2009) or ethnomethodologically-inspired methods (e.g. Llewellyn & Hindmarsh, 2010; 
Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997) both share a commitment to the study of action as it unfolds. They also 
consider language use as action rather than as a mere report of prior events (Pomerantz, Sanders, 
& Bencherki, 2018; Spradley, 1979). Both methodological strategies also share a commitment to 
reflexivity, in order to avoid presuming that the researcher is all-knowing, although their 
approach to reflexivity differs (see Macbeth, 2001). Ethnography and ethnomethodology alike 
have been used in studies that call for the rejection of the distinction between humans and non-
humans as far as agency is concerned (e.g. Cooren, 2004); for instance, they both underpin actor-
network theory (see Latour, 2005). 
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While both methodological traditions seem well aligned with Simondon’s program, the 
latter diverges from them significantly when it comes to the fourth item of the agenda, namely 
not to consider any being as already existing. Indeed, while ethnography pays attention to action, 
it also gives great importance to the meaning people make of that action, which is a central 
ingredient to the tradition’s notion of “thick description” (Geertz, 1973). In this sense, it needs to 
assume that human beings pre-exist the situations that are being described. As for 
ethnomethodology, while it is careful not to give undue weight to people’s intentions and 
cognition, it takes “members” as its starting point and has built its analytical apparatus around 
them (see Munro, 1999). Yet, people (and the meanings they make) are but one set of beings in 
the scene, and in fact their constitution – as members, as people endowed with identities or as 
human beings to start with – can be a situational problem rather than a fact to be taken for granted 
(Ashcraft & Mumby, 2004; Butler, 1990; see on members Bencherki & Snack, 2016). 
These differences are attributable to the different claims that each approach seeks to make 
in relation to communication. Ethnography views communication as a privileged vehicle to 
access culture, including the beliefs, rules and principles that guide action. For 
ethnomethodology, communication is, so to speak, the construction yard where those social 
reality is continuously constructed; it does not exist anywhere but in communication. Simondon’s 
interest, in contrast, lies in the communicative processes themselves, which to him are not 
distinct from the constitution of beings and social reality alike, including the researcher’s own 
constitution. Said otherwise, the question for Simondon is not so much to use communication to 
gather data about constitutive process, but to view any data as communication that is involved in 
constitutive processes. Communication, therefore, is not a gateway to one aspect of reality or 
another, but reality itself.  
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An Empirical Example 
To illustrate the analytical power of a Simondonian perspective on communication, and 
more generally of a perspective that fully embraces the constitutive power of communication, we 
devote the remainder of this article to the analysis of real-life data drawn from prior empirical 
work we have carried out. Also, while the notion of information is usually associated with media 
and communication technology, where Simondon and in particular his book On the Mode of 
Existence of Technical Objects (2016) has had some traction, this simple case will allow us to 
illustrate that Simondon has broader relevance and how the principles laid out above can be 
mobilized to conduct empirical research.  
The case consists in an excerpt from the meeting of a committee that serves as a 
coordination platform for various community organizations in a particularly underprivileged and 
diverse district of Montréal, Québec, Canada. In the excerpt below, Marie, the representative of a 
member organization, shares an idea that a few colleagues and herself, as members of a 
subcommittee on diversity, had and would like to see implemented. It consists in federating the 
various activities that organizations carry out for the integration of immigrants under the umbrella 
of a special “week”—the Integration Action Week (IAW). The case was selected because it 
offers an example of discourse that follows Simondon’s logic; Marie, in a sense, evidences a 
Simondonian theory of communicating and organizing. We include here the transcript of her 
intervention, which is translated from French and edited to exclude some irrelevant portions for 
the sake of space.  
Excerpt 
1 Marie: It’s the Integration Action Week, here in [district]. Uh… So, it’s a week,  
2 you have heard about it a little bit at the last general meeting, ... you may have  
3 received a first document inviting you to register. Let me explain a little bit what it  
4 is. So, my goal here today isn’t to do a report. Of course, you will learn some things,  
5 but I mostly want that you uh: that you commit with us in this: uh: this celebration.  
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6 Okay? So, uh, because the IAW, it integrates in the Council’s work, in relation with  
7 the priorities we just talked about the uh: social housing priority on [location], now  
8 it’s the concerted work on intercultural relations. I remind you that… [quoting from  
9 sheet] “That the Community Council multiplies and strengthens the ties with groups  
10 and members from cultural communities, in order to unfold uh their participation  
11 uh in the Council (?)”. So, it’s also in relation with the accessibility project that  
12 we’ve got with [funding agency]. Uh: so, the IAW (.) I will distribute the sheets. […]  
 
18 Marie: So, from Monday to Thursday. We want to highlight [mettre en valeur] the  
19 wonderful work that we do regarding integration, in our respective groups.  
20 But now we would like it to be seen, that we let it be known in the media, among  
21 others, and so we want to set up a calendar of activities. It’s not about making up  
22 actions you’re not doing, but maybe about saying “there is that thing we’re doing  
23 with parents, where we encourage exchanges, where we foster mutual help” or  
24 whatever formula you’ve got. Uh, well, that’s integration work. It’s integration  
25 work, we’ll take it in a broad sense. Even if you can’t welcome more than twenty  
26 people in your premises, it’s worth saying, inscribing it in the calendar and  
27 saying “that, it exists.” Or maybe to invite a person or two from another group  
28 to see what’s happening, to get acquainted, to highlight it, in the media, uh, on the 
29 map, but also among ourselves, because isn’t the work of knowing each other part  
30 of integration? You know it, we develop many things, we do a really extraordinary  
31 work, but we have to highlight it. So, uh, during that week, well, uh, first, I am 
32 talking to you as a member of the “Intercultural Concerted Work” committee,  
33 and of the IAW sub-committee. […] 
 
39 Marie: Uh, uh, it’s the committee that had the idea of doing  
40 this week, but the week, it’s not the committee’s week. (1) It’s everyone’s  
41 week (.) That of all the community workers in [district], and we were even saying  
42 uh there’s extraordinary work from the community groups, at least that’s what I  
43 see as a member of the Community Council, but there are other kinds of groups  
44 there are other uh other interventions that are being done in the district  
45 that are entirely in the spirit of integration, of facilitating integration, for example  
46 in institutions, whether the [French-learning] centre across, whether the [proximity health  
47 centre] services, or others. So, what we want to do is a calendar  
48 of activities (1), so I invite you to register in that calendar. Uh, we also want to do  
49 a “passport for integration” and a web site. So, the passport uh will give uh uh 
50 (inaudible) to the residents and to the community workers. So, we are aiming at  
51 workers a lot, of course, eh, I think that it’s up to us to share information  
52 on what we’re doing. But obviously, our members, there are many other groups,  
53 maybe, bring our gr: our gang, once, of course during the week we can’t see  
54 everything, but say to yourself, “ah, I’ll go see what they’re doing over there”  
55 or go see the neighbour, even if it’s next door, what are they doing at their place.   
56 Uh, so, then, we’ve got, we’ve got a web site, we will write the week’s activities 
57 and people will be able to spot that on a map as well and if groups have web sites 
58 we’ll put a link to your own web site. To get on the calendar (0.5) to get in the 
59 network of integration. 
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While this transcript is a very partial representation of what took place during those few minutes, 
it provides us with some insight regarding what went on concretely. One of us, the first author, 
was present at the event and had witnessed many similar meetings of that committee over his 
years of involvement as an ethnographer.  
I (the author who participated) saw the organizations change, people come and go, 
struggles being won or lost, partnerships being formed and dissolved. In that respect, my 
knowledge of the involved organizations, people, or events is also a knowledge of their 
individuation, of the way they became who or what they have become. This knowledge is not 
simply based on observation—these organizations, people, and events also affected me. I 
changed along with them in significant ways; not only did I get a PhD thanks to them, I also 
became committed to community-engaged research, I did consultation work for some of the 
organizations, and I made several friends. The meaning of my fieldwork, therefore, comes from 
the way it contributed to ordering relations, including to make me who I am (proposition 4). 
Marie’s speech is reminiscent of Simondon’s conception of communication. Indeed, she 
recognizes herself that her goal is not to report, but to get others to “commit with us […] in this 
celebration” (l. 5). She therefore has in mind a view of communication (or at least of her speech) 
as aiming to create new connections between people and organizations. For instance, she presents 
the subcommittee as being ordered in a particular way—it believes in the “wonderful work” (l. 19) 
and the “really extraordinary work” (l. 34) that the organizations do in terms of integration and in 
the importance of holding the week in a particular way. Now, Marie wants to propagate that 
ordering to the rest of the Council. Marie wants to “inform” her fellow Council members, not 
only in the sense of letting them know about the subcommittee’s idea, but also because she wants 
to organize her colleagues and their organizations into the Integration Activity Week. Seemingly 
espousing Simondon’s understanding of information, her goal is not only to transmit pieces of 
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“information,” in the common sense of the word, but to give a new shape to the Council, order it 
in a particular way, and provide it, so to speak, with new organs that would allow it to capture 
“integration work,” and thus (re)organize it (Cooren, 2018). Indeed, as she reminds later, the 
week does not only belong to the subcommittee, “It’s everyone’s week” (l. 41), her effort thus 
consisting in leading others to appropriate it (Bencherki & Cooren, 2011). 
To do so, she shows that in fact the Council is already ordered in a way that makes it 
receptive to the new information. First, she establishes that her suggestion agrees with prior 
decisions and priorities of the Council, by quoting from a sheet (presumably her notes from the 
prior conversation). For instance, she explains that the week is “in relation with the priorities” (l. 
8) that they had just talked about and quoting one such priority regarding the strengthening of ties 
with cultural communities (l. 11). Then, she explains that she is in fact not asking of her 
colleagues to undertake new actions: they are already doing the work. Indeed, it is not a matter of 
“making up actions you’re not doing” (l. 21-22), but simply of highlighting them and providing 
them with a new and heightened meaning through their inclusion in the week.  
She then provides the ordering principles that would allow constituting the IAW and 
therefore connect together the individual actions in a new way: the calendar in which she invites 
her colleagues to write down the integration actions they are doing. For Marie, there is an 
equivalence between inscribing an activity in the calendar and creating a new ordering of these 
activities: “To get on the calendar (0.5) to get in the network of integration” (l. 58-59). She 
presents the calendar as a solution to giving more meaning to their activities: “we would like it to 
be seen [….] and so we want to set up a calendar of activities” (l. 20-21). This ordering therefore 
proceeds from kin to kin, in the minutiae of how people will register using the document they 
received (l. 3) or the sheets she distributes (l. 12). Later, she explains, this will be turned into a 
“passport” (in fact a flyer with the calendar printed on it), which will offer one materialization of 
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the activities’ ordering. Marie shows how it is a very concrete, kin to kin accomplishment. It 
consists in a calendar where she invites her colleagues to write down activities they wish to 
contribute to the week; the calendar will then be turned into what she calls a “passport” (which in 
fact will turn out to be a printed flyer with a calendar on it), and put on the committee’s website. 
She even brought sign-up sheets with her, so that people can write down activities right away. 
Achieving a particular ordering is therefore a kin-to-kin performance; Marie makes a speech, 
each human participant writes down an activity in a sheet, which are compiled into a calendar, 
and turned into a passport and a website, which are then sent to partners and to the media, and so 
forth. Each time, relations are established or strengthened between the various actions – but also 
between the organizations – and are defined by the “week” to which they participate. Each time, 
also, the existence of both the week and of “its” activities is highlighted. This existence is 
established as the week’s ordering propagates from a sub-committee’s conversation, to a speech, 
to the committee, to the sign-up sheets, to the calendar, to the passport, etc. (proposition 1). 
Eventually, when the IAW takes place, Marie promises that the “wonderful work” the 
organizations do will gain more existence and signification: as she explains, “we want to 
highlight” (l. 18; also l. 31) that work. The French “mettre en valeur” is even more explicit, as it 
literally translates to “put in value,” thus stressing that the activities would be more valuable if 
they were part of the week. Contributing their actions to the week allow the activities to “be seen” (l. 
20) and to get “on the map” (l. 28-29). “Inscribing [an activity] in the calendar” amounts to “saying, 
‘that, it exists’” (l. 26-27). The week consists in ordering otherwise scattered actions into a new, 
coherent collective being; what ordering the actions into a week also does is order the organizations 
and other partners in a more significant way. 
The result of Mary’s speech is not only that her audience is better “informed” in the 
conventional sense of the word. It is also that an ordering that existed within the subcommittee 
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(their perception of the connection between diverse action and their value, their commitment to 
integration, their understanding of the Council’s mission, and so forth) is propagated outside, to 
other members of the Council, who are now similarly ordered. This new ordering did take place: 
the IAW saw the light of day, thus giving meaning to actions of the community-based 
organizations, but also rebounding on Mary’s speech and showing its significance and 
signification as a founding moment of the new initiative. 
This analysis makes a certain number of assumptions: we suppose that whoever 
participated in that meeting understands the French language in which it originally took place, 
can read the various documents, and knows the conventional meaning of each of the words, 
expressions, tables, etc. There is also an assumption that people have some understanding of what 
the words and other practices refer to in the situation where they find themselves. We could argue 
that each of those elements may also be explained by referring to the four propositions above. For 
instance, an immigrant’s ability to use French – and there were indeed many immigrants at the 
meeting, including the first author – is the outcome of that person’s continued individuation in a 
French-speaking society (say, Québec), and their knowledge of French is also a knowledge of 
how they have changed over the past months or years along with their adoptive country or city 
(proposition 4). The same could be said of native speakers, if we extend the timeframe to each 
person’s whole biography. Indeed, what the words, expressions, etc., signify to that person is 
what the words have done to them and how they have changed them (compare this with 
Wittgenstein, 1953). 
Conclusion 
Ruth Smith’s (1993) formulation of the root metaphor equating communication to 
organization has received, for the most part, a one-sided treatment in organizational 
communication theorizing, showing how communication builds identities, collectives, 
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organizations and societies, but not the other way around. In a sense, communication scholars 
interested in its constitutive power have been studying collectives and their communicational 
nature more than they have been doing research on communication as such, to possibly show in 
what ways communication may be conceptualized from an organizing perspective. Obviously, 
our goal is not to suggest that communication scholars start studying exclusively in the other 
direction but rather that they find theoretical positions where communicating and organizing (or 
constituting) are truly a single process. We provided one example of a theory of communication 
that is genuinely “organizational” in its treatment of communication; Simondon’s (1958/2005) 
notion of informational individuation. By showing how communication organizes, in a single 
process, the domains through which it circulates, Simondon fuses communicating and 
organizing; i.e., his theory of communication is a theory of organization-in-the-making. 
The example of a Simondon-inspired transductive perspective on communication 
illustrates that there are still unexplored ways in which (organizational) communication scholars 
could conceptualize communication for the sake of redefining the organization-communication 
relation. Our hope with this paper is to elicit more debates over the relationship between 
organization and communication and on underlying conceptions of communication. We think this 
is needed to rejuvenate the sort of methods that communication researchers use, the kind of 
knowledge they produce, the understandings of organization that they adopt, and the way they 
relate to communication practitioners. This paper has attempted to at least question the 
assumptions on which organizational communication theories have been constructed, while 
making explicit the understandings of communication that are at the heart of organizational 
communication research. 
Revisiting the metatheoretical assumptions of communication dynamics would amount to more 
than a cosmetic change to theorizing, as it would impact methods (including the communication 
INFORMATIONAL INDIVIDUATION 32 
researcher’s role within research), views of beings, collectives and organizations, as well as, 
arguably, the sort of advice that researchers may be able to provide to practitioners. Indeed, on 
the latter point, a Simondonian perspective, by equating communicating and organizing, also 
implies not distinguishing between managerial functions and communication roles in 
organizations, for instance. Communication professionals, thus, are positioned on the center 
stage, and communication activities – whether marketing, advertising, journalism, and so forth – 
cannot be separated from their performative role in shaping up our common world. The 
suggestion to question assumptions in organizational communication theory may be met with 
some resistance, given that we are formulating it at a time when the suggestion that 
communication has constitutive power is being increasingly well-received, and when it may 
appear that there is no need to question the work being done. The maturation of a research 
tradition, however, requires that theories be kept flexible and that the field remains in a constant 
process of re-organizing. Another limitation to our suggestion is that, of course, current theories 
were developed in given contexts and inherit from many debates and conversations. It is hard, if 
possible, at all, to “retrofit” new conceptions of communication in an already well-developed 
field. This difficulty should not prevent researchers from trying. We are not expecting that 
communication researchers change all their theories from one day to the next because they would 
suddenly “discover” a new theory of communication. We know the sociology and history of 
science too well to believe that the field of communication could follow such a model of 
discovery (Bijker, 1995; Latour, 1987). Yet, if communication researchers keep the conversation 
alive about collective assumptions regarding communication, and how interest in organizations 
and collectives may fuel a theory of communication, then communication researchers may be in 
decent shape to make contributions not only to the understanding of organizations, but also to the 
way communication is comprehended, well beyond the boundaries of any single sub-field. 
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